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A B S T R A C T
This paper explores the influence of innovation on the probability of survival of two hundred top British firms
founded throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To this end, we have collected the firms’ significant
innovations and classified them by Schumpeterian types, patented and non-patented and domestic and imported.
The number of patents registered by the firms throughout their lifetime−a rough measure of their incremental
innovation activity– has also been recorded. In addition, twelve control variables −five characteristics of the
firms and seven of their business leaders– have been included. Both log-normal and gamma duration models
have been used in the analysis. They have been estimated, firstly for the whole set of firms and, secondly, for the
manufacturing and the service firms separately to control for industry differences. The results of the log-normal
and gamma estimations are highly coincident, with some nuances. The significant innovations −particularly
new processes, non-patented and domestic ones– have been found to positively influence the probability of
business survival. The number of patent applications seems to increase the survival probability of the manu-
facturing firms, but not of the service ones. Among the control variables, the firm’s size, its international di-
mension, and the age of the business leader at entry seem to be the most influential ones on business survival,
although there are some differences between manufacturing and services. The main results are robust to the
division of the sample by entry period.
1. Introduction
Most firms aspire to last for long, but only some of them manage to
survive more than a few years. Thus, durability is a clear indicator of
business success, the key one according to Barnard (1938). Not sur-
prisingly, business survival has attracted the interest of many scholars
since a long time ago. Among the variety of factors considered to in-
fluence business longevity,1 innovation is a prominent one. Many stu-
dies analyzing the relationship between both variables have been
published, but the theme is far from exhausted as some conflicting re-
sults have appeared and many aspects of that relationship remain un-
explored. This is in part due to the difficulty to obtain data on in-
novation, especially in disaggregated terms. In addition, data are
usually available only for short periods of time, hindering long-term
analyses, particularly valuable when studying longevity.
The present paper aims to delve in the two aforementioned direc-
tions. To this end, we have constructed an ad hoc data set of innova-
tions introduced by the arguably top two hundred British companies of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Therefore, the study does not
deal with average firms, but with a selected group of outstanding ones.
They were outstanding in several aspects, including durability, com-
pared with the average firm, but at the same time they were very di-
verse, also in terms of longevity. Our purpose is to study the factors
influencing that survival diversity. In particular, we will test whether
the selected firms’ longevity was related with their innovation activity
(level and type), controlling for some features of the companies and of
their founders/leaders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains an
overview of the previous literature, including an explanation of our
motivations and contributions. In Section 3, the sources, data and ap-
proach of the study are described. The explanatory and control vari-
ables and the empirical duration models used are explained in Section
4. The results of the estimations of the econometric models and a ro-
bustness check are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature and research motivation
Business survival has been found to be influenced by many factors,
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such as the characteristics of the market (Audretsch and Mahmood,
1995; Mata et al., 1995; Agarwal and Gort, 2002), the industry life
cycle (Agarwal, 1997), the sector’s technological intensity (Schumpeter,
1942; Audretsch, 1995; Mata et al., 1995; Aghion et al., 2001), the size
and age of the firm (Evans, 1987; Geroski, 1995; Sutton, 1997; Cefis
and Marsili, 2005), its profitability and financial constraints (Headd,
2003; Bellone et al., 2008), its innovation activity (Hall, 1987; Ericson
and Pakes, 1995; Esteve-Pérez et al., 2004; Cefis and Marsili, 2005), its
pre-entry experience (Boeker, 1988; Klepper, 2002; Thomson, 2005), as
well as the founder’s personal features (Vivarelli and Audretsch, 1998;
Arrighetti and Vivarelli, 1999; Headd, 2003; Persson, 2004; Colombo
and Grilli, 2005; Arribas and Vila, 2007; Saridakis et al., 2008).2 Factors
like size, age or profitability of the firm have received prominent at-
tention by empirical studies on survival, but the interest in innovation
has increased recently.
Several studies have shown a positive influence of innovation on sur-
vival, although others have not found a clear relation or have detected
conflicting effects (Jensen et al., 2008; Buddelmeyer et al., 2010; Børing,
2015). This is partially explained by the variety−in nature and quality– of
the innovation measures used, which also makes comparisons across studies
difficult (Buddelmeyer et al., 2010, p. 265). Specialists have highlighted the
necessity of fitter and more disaggregated data at the firm level to solve the
conflicting results and to better understand how innovation affects survival
(Cefis and Marsili, 2006; Børing, 2015).
Most studies on the relationship between innovation and business
survival have used R&D and/or patent data (e.g., Geroski, 1995;
Audretsch, 1995; Esteve-Pérez et al., 2004; Buddelmeyer et al., 2010;
Tsvetkova et al., 2014; Ugur et al., 2016; Kim and Lee, 2016). The
problems of such indicators as measures of innovation imply certain
limits in the analyses based on them,3 notwithstanding the valuable
insights they have provided. Although all measures of innovation are
imperfect (Neely and Hii, 1998, p. 37), innovation counts is probably
the best one as it is not a proxy but a direct reflection of the innovation
activity (Geroski, 1994, pp. 7–12; Neely and Hii, 1998, p. 36). But these
indicators are particularly scarce, a reason why business survival stu-
dies using them are less abundant. Nevertheless a growing number of
them have appeared in the last years (Cefis and Marsili, 2005, 2006,
2011, 2012; Klepper and Simons, 2005; Fontana and Nesta, 2009;
Børing, 2015; Sharif and Huang, 2012).4
The latter studies have obtained the data on innovation outputs
from Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) (Cefis and Marsili, 2005,
2006, 2011, 2012; Børing, 2015), specialized journals and company
reports (Klepper and Simons, 2005; Fontana and Nesta, 2009) or ad hoc
company surveys (Sharif and Huang, 2012). Like them, the present one
analyzes the influence of innovation outputs on business survival at the
firm level, but unlike them (except Klepper and Simons, 2005) it adopts
a long-term approach, so the sources used by the mentioned studies
−covering a short time span– are not useful for our purposes. In order
to get the kind of data we need, we have resorted to the prosopo-
graphical method, that is, to a systematic collection of information from
business biographies, which will be described in Section 3.
An important contribution by Cefis and Marsili (2005, 2006) was to
show that the effect on survival of product and process innovations−in
both cases positive (‘innovation premium’)– had some significant dif-
ferences, indicating the interest of disaggregating innovations by types
(see also Børing, 2015 and Cefis and Marsili, 2011, 2012). But, ac-
cording to Schumpeter’s (1934) taxonomy, in addition to product and
process, there are another three kinds of innovations (organizational,
new markets, and new sources of supply), of which relation with
business survival has not yet been explored.5 Thus, building upon the
aforementioned contributions, the present study widens the focus to all
Schumpeterian forms of innovation, aiming at testing their potentially
different effect on business survival.
But innovation can be disaggregated by other criteria also useful to
better understand its nature as well as its relation with longevity. This
study has included two additional classifications. First, we have dis-
tinguished between patented and non-patented innovations. Due to
their potential differences in nature, their effect on business survival
may differ, but there is almost no evidence about this. It is true that
some studies have found differential effects of patents and trademarks
on survival (Buddelmeyer et al., 2010; Helmers and Rogers, 2010),
showing the interest of disaggregating innovations in this way, but
trademarks can only be considered a proxy of certain (marketing) in-
novations, not a measure of all non-patented innovations. The present
study takes a step forward in this sense as it distinguishes between
patented and all kinds of non-patented innovations. Secondly, we have
also disaggregated the innovations between domestic and imported
ones as they may also have different characteristics and a differential
effect on survival. We are not aware of previous research on this, so we
expect to make a contribution on the matter.
It has been debated whether the economic impact of radical in-
novations appearing occasionally is greater than that of incremental
ones arising much more frequently. Schumpeter (1934) gave more
importance to the former, while Usher (1954) emphasized the re-
levance of the latter, to cite two classical views. Over time, opinion has
grown that the cumulative effect of incremental innovations may be the
most important (Rosenberg, 1982, pp. 62–70; Fagerberg, 2005, pp.
7–8).6 But the focus of these analyses has been the effect of the two
types of innovation on productivity, few of them having tried to mea-
sure their influence on survival (Buddelmeyer et al., 2010). In order to
add some evidence on this, we have recorded two different innovation
indicators: (1) the significant (radical or important) innovations de-
veloped by the selected firms, and (2) the total amount of patents re-
gistered by them throughout their lifetime, which may be seen as a
rough proxy of their more ordinary (incremental) innovation activity as
explained in detail in subsection 4.1.
Most empirical studies on innovation and business longevity have fo-
cused on the manufacturing sector (Evans, 1987; Hall, 1987; Audretsch,
1995; Esteve-Pérez et al., 2004; Cefis and Marsili, 2005, 2006; Klepper and
Simons, 2005; Fontana and Nesta, 2009; Tsvetkova et al., 2014; Kim and
Lee, 2016). This is partially explained by the greater availability of data on
that sector, but given the importance of the service industry in modern
economies, it seems convenient to analyze it as well. In fact, researchers are
increasingly looking at both manufacturing and services (Persson, 2004;
Buddelmeyer et al., 2010; Helmers and Rogers, 2010; Sharif and Huang,
2012; Børing, 2015; Ugur et al., 2016), finding significant differences be-
tween them in terms of business survival. Following these contributions, our
data set also includes both manufacturing and service companies.
2 For a survey of the literature on business survival from the viewpoint of industrial
organization, see Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod (2008), and Riviezzo et al. (2015)
from the management and business history perspectives.
3 Without going into detail, it can be said that the general limitation of both indicators
is that, by definition, they can only reflect part of the innovation activity, so studies based
only on them may undervalue the innovation activity of firms, sectors, etc. In addition, R
&D is not properly an indicator of innovation but of the effort to increase the scientific
and technical capabilities, which may have various orientations. Patents are neither,
strictly speaking, an indicator of innovation, although they are so more properly than R&
D. In any case, they are also a partial indicator as many innovations are not patented for a
variety of reasons (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000). For two useful overviews on the matter, see
Griliches (1990) and Geroski (1994, pp. 6–7).
4 Studies using innovation output measures to analyze business performance indicators
different from survival (Gunday et al., 2011; Baumann and Kritikos, 2016) or other as-
pects like persistence in innovation behavior (Tavassoli and Karlsson, 2015) have also
appeared lately.
5 The analysis of all the Schumpeterian forms of innovations has been highlighted as a
lacuna of innovation studies in general (Shane, 2003, p. 34). Certainly the lacuna has
begun to be filled by a number of studies (e.g., Ruef, 2002; Gunday et al., 2011; Tavassoli
and Karlsson, 2015), but not in the specific case of business survival research as far as we
know.
6 Mokyr (1990, Chapter 11) differentiates between macro inventions and micro in-
ventions (not innovations), concluding that both types are complementary and indis-
pensable for technological progress.
J.M. Ortiz-Villajos, S. Sotoca Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
2
The aforementioned studies have predominantly a short-term ap-
proach, analyzing the firms’ hazard of exit within a span of a few years.
Unlike them, our study covers a very long period, but it builds upon
their findings in many aspects. On the other hand, the empirical studies
on survival with a long-term approach (e.g., Carroll et al., 1996;
Klepper, 2002; Thomson, 2005; Cabral and Wang, 2013) have not
normally focused on innovation, but we have built on them in other
aspects since their object of study – firms entering and exiting at dif-
ferent points in time throughout the years – is similar to ours.7
3. Data
3.1. Source and population of the study
As has been explained, the data for the present study −not readily
available– have been collected ‘by hand’ from business biographies.
They are a valuable source of information because out of the en-
trepreneurs’ biographies it is possible to obtain a variety of data about
them and their firms in order to analyze different aspects of their ac-
tivity. In fact, this (prosopographical) method has already demon-
strated its usefulness to analyze questions dealing with the wealth
distribution, education, management, financing and performance of top
business leaders/firms (Nicholas, 1999a,b; Tortella et al., 2009, 2013;
Fellman, 2014; Toninelli and Vasta, 2014), but not with their innova-
tion activity and survival. This is a gap of the literature which is worth
filling; the present study trying to do a contribution in this line by
analyzing the relation between innovation and survival of the allegedly
top two hundred British business leaders/firms8 of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. They have been selected among those contained in
the well-known Dictionary of Business Biography (DBB) (Jeremy and
Shaw, 1984-86), which intends to include the most remarkable British
entrepreneurs/firms. Although there is always room for debate, the
great majority of them have been considered to have enough merits to
be included in the dictionary (see Nicholas, 1999b, pp. 692-4).
The prime qualification for entry to the DBB was the “achievement
of some considerable business impact […] rather than political, chari-
table or community work” (Jeremy, 1984, p. 5). In words of the pro-
moters of the dictionary, the “result is neither a random nor a stratified
sample, but it does, we suggest, provide a balanced and comprehensive
coverage of those who have made a significant contribution to business
leadership in Britain over the last 120 years” (Jeremy and Shaw, 1984-
86, vol I, p. viii).9 The elite of two hundred entrepreneurs/firms has
been selected with the same criteria as the DBB, that is, according not to
their size or longevity but to their “business impact” and “contribution
to business leadership”.10 So, they are allegedly the most influential
firms in their sectors, significantly contributing to shape them and be-
coming reference actors in the national and (in many cases) in the in-
ternational context. Naturally, this is reflected in a performance above
the average in several features (size, survival, etc.), but they are far
from homogeneous in those aspects, as will be shown in Section 4.
Although this selection can be debated, the firms included (such as
Austin, Baring, Barclays, Cadbury, Clark, Deloitte, Dunlop, Glaxo,
Guinness, John Lewis, Marks & Spencer, Morris, Platt, Reuters, Rolls-
Royce, Vickers, etc.) are generally recognized as outstanding (see
Appendix A for the complete list). It is also important to point out that
we have not selected them (nor has the DBB done so for the whole list)
because of their innovative character, but mainly considering their
great business impact. That is, the selection is not a list of the most
innovative companies. To sum up, the study deals with the innovation
activity and survival of an elitist group of British firms, presumably the
most remarkable ones of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The
option of focusing on a selective sample of companies instead of on a
random one has its problems. For instance, the results of the study
cannot be easily extrapolated to average firms, at least automatically.
But we believe that analyzing outstanding companies can be very useful
as there are many things to learn from them. In addition, the great
influence they exert in the economy as a whole makes their analysis
appealing and relevant per se as the studies cited in the following
paragraph (and in the first one of the present subsection) have shown.
Our study is based on a selection of 200 top firms−and not another
number– for several reasons. One of them is that some experts on the
DBB have already done that selection and obtained interesting results
with it (Tortella et al., 2009). But they have analyzed the relation be-
tween education (of the business leaders) and firm performance, not
between innovation and business survival. Hence, we considered worth
using the same selection (with some variations as explained in footnote
13) for our study. Besides, other influential academic studies on firm
performance and survival have also been based on samples of 100–200
top companies,11 so their usefulness is contrasted. This is also the case
in the business and economic spheres, where rankings and reports of
the top 50, 100, 200 or 500 firms are widespread.12 Finally, the size of
the sample had to be assumable for us in terms of cost given that we had
to build the whole database from scratch, this being very much time
consuming.13
3.2. Temporal and sectoral coordinates
The temporal distribution of the two hundred selected business
leaders/firms follows, by and large, that of the DBB as a whole. The first
entrepreneur was born in 1793 and the last one in 1918 (1789 and 1925
respectively for the DBB), while the first to die was in 1872 and the last
one in 2002 (1868 and 2008 respectively for the DBB). The entry date
in our analysis is the year when the entrepreneurs founded (or became
leaders of) their companies,14 the first one doing so in 1816 and the last
one in 1957. The exit date is the year of the firm’s liquidation,
7 Klepper and Simons (2005) is one of the few empirical studies analyzing the relation
between innovation and business survival in the long run. In this sense, it is similar to
ours, but its approach is quite different, among other things because it focuses on four
specific products (automobiles, tires, televisions, and penicillin) during industry shake-
outs. On the other hand, business history and strategic management studies on longevity
have frequently adopted a long-term approach, but they are based on case studies rather
than on quantitative analysis of groups of firms. In addition, they are rarely focused on
innovation, although this factor has a significant role in the narratives of some of them
(e.g., Chandler, 1977, 1990; Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Sull, 1999; Fleck, 2009).
8 A company is the making of a business leader, so the entrepreneur and the firm are
somehow inseparable. It is obvious, though, that the features of the firm (size, etc.) are
different from the personal traits of the entrepreneur (education, etc.), so we shall dis-
tinguish between them in the analysis. When we use the term firm, we refer to company
or enterprise, not plant, throughout the whole text.
9 The entrepreneurs were selected by a rigorous process with the advice of a group of
experts. For more details, see the Introduction to the first volume of the DBB.
10 Our selection builds upon the “Elite of 200 English entrepreneurs” established by
Tortella et al. (2009), but we have modified it because our focus is the firm rather than
the entrepreneur. This means that when two (or three) entrepreneurs have worked to-
gether in the same firm, we have considered them a ‘unit’. So, in order to have a list of 200
leading companies, we have enlarged Tortella’s selection. To sum up, our database con-
sists of 200 firms (or business groups) and contains information of 217 entrepreneurs
included in 211 biographies (18% of the DBB).
11 For example, Chandler (1990) is based on the top 200 industrial companies of the
USA, UK and Germany; Hannah (1998), on the world’s largest 100 industrial corpora-
tions; Whittington and Mayer (2000), on the top 100 British, French, and German com-
panies; and Cassis and Brautaset (2003), on the top 100 companies of several European
countries.
12 The size of those lists depends on several criteria such as the size of the sector or the
country, but also on a certain discretional decision. Usually, the larger the list, the less
information of each company it provides. Hence, the analytical reports on top companies
are mostly based on the top 50, 100 or 200 firms (Thomson Reuters Top 100 Global
Innovators; Pwc global top 100 companies, etc.).
13 In particular, we spent a whole year to collect the information on the 200 firms.
14 The DBB describes the history of each company from the point of view of its key
business leader (the one that made the firm outstanding), whether founder or not. Hence,
it provides information (on the variables included in the model) mostly on the period
after that key business leader became the head of the company. This is why we have taken
that year as the entry date, which coincides with the firm’s foundation year when the
business leader is the founder.
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bankruptcy or absorption by another company15 up to 2013, when the
information was collected.16 It is certain that not all types of exit are the
same and that this could be taken into account in the analysis as some
recent studies have done (e.g., Cefis and Marsili, 2011, 2012; Børing,
2015). Nevertheless, in this case we decided −as most survival studies
so far– to focus on the firms’ longevity and not on how they exited
because the firms in our data set were born to last and not to be sold or
transferred in a few years as many startups aim nowadays. Hence, the
end of the original entrepreneurial project (firm), either by acquisition
or death, could be considered a failure from that point of view. This
does not exclude the possibility and interest of distinguishing between
types of exit, but that would be the object of a different paper.
To sum up, our data set constitutes a “flow” of companies entering
and exiting at different points in time from 1816 to 2013, so it is right-
censored to 2013 as we do not know what happened with the surviving
companies after that year. The flow of entries and exits is shown by
Fig. 1, which also includes the number of active firms throughout the
whole period.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the selected firms by spell dura-
tion, main industrial sector and entry period (We have distinguished
between firms entering during the golden age of the British economy in
terms of world dominance, c. 1815–1875, and afterwards). Their most
common longevity in all has been between 51 and 100 years (46.5% of
the firms), only 21% of them having survived less than 50 years. The
average duration was 85.4 years.17 This longevity is outstanding given
that very few companies survive more than ten years (Shane, 2003, p.
5), although it is important to point out that the range of variation in
survival time among our selected firms is enormous (from 14 to 184
years). In relation with their main sector of activity, manufacturing
accounts for 70% of the firms, and services for the remaining
30%.18 Apart from the exclusion of the agricultural sector, this is a well-
known bias of the DBB considering that the weight of manufacturing in
a balanced list of firms should be of about 46% according with the
employment share of manufacturing in the British economy.19 How-
ever, as we do not intend our set of companies to be a proportional
representation of the whole British business sector but of the most re-
markable British companies (these being notoriously more abundant in
manufacturing),20 controlling for industry differences−manufacturing
versus services– within our sample is not inadequate.21
Fig. 1. Entries, exits and active firms, 1816–2013.
Table 1
Firms’ distribution by spell duration to 2013, main industrial sector, and entry
period.
Firms entering in
1816–1875
Firms entering in
1876–1957
All firms
Number % Number % Number %
Spell duration:
14–50 years 9 10.7 33 28.4 42 21.0
51–100 years 31 36.9 62 53.4 93 46.5
More than 100
years
44 52.4 21 18.1 65 32.5
All firms 84 100.0 116 100.0 200 100.0
Main industrial
sector:
Manufacturing 61 72.6 79 68.1 140 70.0
Services 23 27.4 37 31.9 60 30.0
All firms 84 100.0 116 100.0 200 100.0
15 In this we follow other studies such as Esteve-Pérez et al. (2004), for which “A firm
is computed to exit in year t when this is the last year of independent operation by the
firm. Therefore exit includes permanent closure, firm in liquidation, shift to [… other]
activities and being acquired by another firm. When two firms merge, we […] consider
the bigger one in the merger as a continuing firm and the smaller firm as an exiting one”
(Ibid., p. 257).
16 The DBB gives information previous to 1984-86, so data for subsequent years have
been obtained from other sources such as the companies’ web pages or the Oxford
Dictionary of National Biography.
17 With little variation between the manufacturing (85.8 years) and the service firms
(84.4 years). The median longevity is 83.5 years for the whole set, 82.5 for the manu-
facturing group, and 85.5 for the services one (see Table 2).
18 Given that there are only 4 construction firms (2%), we have included them in the
services group for the analysis.
19 Estimation made by Nicholas (1999b, p. 694) based on the sectoral shares of em-
ployment in Britain calculated by Broadberry (1998) for the period 1870–1990.
20 The share of the manufacturing sector in the DBB as a whole is 66% (Nicholas
1999b, p. 694), almost the same as the elite’s.
21 Anyway, weighting the empirical results is not necessary when the endogenous
variable is continuous, as is our case. It is certain that when the endogenous variable is
binary (0–1) or multinomial, the sub-sample sizes must be fixed to the population per-
centage of each qualitative outcome to avoid sample selection biases. If it is impossible or
inconvenient to do this, an alternative is optimizing a weighted likelihood function with
different weights to the addends corresponding to the over- and under-sampled popula-
tions.
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4. Variables and empirical model
Given that our main objective is to analyze the relation between the
innovation activity and the longevity of the two hundred selected
British companies, the key explanatory variables in the study deal with
innovation. In particular, we have used two different measures of the
firms’ innovation activity: their significant innovations and their overall
patent applications. In addition, we have included twelve control
variables, five related with characteristics of the firm and seven with its
founder or business leader. Summary statistics for all the variables,
distinguishing by groups of firms (all of them; manufacturing and ser-
vices; firms entering before and after 1875) are presented in Table 2.
4.1. Explanatory variables
Several studies have used significant innovations to analyze the
relation between innovation and business performance (e.g., Scherer,
1982; Pavitt, 1984; Geroski, 1994; Fontana et al., 2012). Their data sets
of innovations have normally been selected by experts. The present one
follows the same criterion, the ‘experts’ being in this case the authors of
the DBB. That is, we have compiled the significant innovations devel-
oped by the two hundred selected firms as reported in the DBB. Like the
SPRU database, we have recorded innovations “successfully commer-
cialized or used in the United Kingdom, whether first developed in the
UK or in any other country” (Pavitt, 1984, p. 344). But the latter in-
cludes only product and process innovations of some manufacturing
sectors, while ours includes all Schumpeterian types of innovation (new
products or services, new processes or methods of production, new
ways of organization, new markets, new sources of supply, and new
marketing methods)22 of both manufacturing and service firms. In ad-
dition, we have differentiated between patented and non-patented in-
novations and between domestic and imported ones, the latter included
only when the importer was the pioneer in implementing them, at least
in the UK.
One reason to distinguish between patented and non-patented in-
novations is their difference in nature. For instance, some innovations
cannot inherently be patented and, according to our data, patented
Table 2
Summary statistics.
All firms Manufacturing firms Service firms Firms entering in
1816–1875
Firms entering in
1876–1957
Mean (S.E.) Median Mean (S.E.) Median Mean (S.E.) Median Mean (S.E.) Median Mean (S.E.) Median
Spell duration (Years) 85.43 (37.58) 83.50 85.86 (36.22) 82.50 84.43 (40.90) 85.50 103.63 (40.45) 106.50 72.25 (29.09) 73.00
Significant Innovations − SI
(Number)
2.66 (1.71) 2.00 2.87 (1.75) 3.00 2.15 (1.53) 2.00 2.61 (1.80) 3.00 2.69 (1.65) 2.00
SI by Schumpeterian forms:
New Product SI 1.09 (1.30) 1.00 1.30 (1.39) 1.00 0.58 (0.89) 0.00 0.90 (1.09) 1.00 1.22 (1.42) 1.00
New Process SI 0.72 (1.04) 0.00 0.78 (1.05) 0.00 0.58 (1.01) 0.00 1.02 (1.24) 1.00 0.50 (0.80) 0.00
Organizational SI 0.33 (0.67) 0.00 0.26 (0.50) 0.00 0.48 (0.95) 0.00 0.25 (0.56) 0.00 0.38 (0.74) 0.00
Marketing SI 0.36 (0.66) 0.00 0.38 (0.67) 0.00 0.30 (0.62) 0.00 0.27 (0.63) 0.00 0.41 (0.67) 0.00
New Market SI 0.07 (0.31) 0.00 0.05 (0.22) 0.00 0.12 (0.45) 0.00 0.08 (0.39) 0.00 0.06 (0.24) 0.00
New Source of Supply SI 0.06 (0.28) 0.00 0.06 (0.27) 0.00 0.05 (0.29) 0.00 0.06 (0.28) 0.00 0.06 (0.27) 0.00
Patented/Non-patented SI:
Patented SI 1.00 (1.42) 0.00 1.26 (1.53) 1.00 0.40 (0.87) 0.00 1.01 (1.38) 0.00 0.99 (1.45) 0.00
Non-patented SI 1.66 (1.37) 1.00 1.61 (1.33) 1.00 1.75 (1.47) 2.00 1.60 (1.39) 1.00 1.70 (1.36) 2.00
Domestic/Imported SI:
Domestic SI 2.22 (1.56) 2.00 2.36 (1.63) 2.00 1.87 (1.33) 2.00 2.20 (1.72) 2.00 2.22 (1.44) 2.00
Imported SI 0.40 (0.71) 0.00 0.46 (0.75) 0.00 0.25 (0.57) 0.00 0.39 (0.73) 0.00 0.41 (0.70) 0.00
Total patent applications
(Number)
1,463.71
(8,004.84)
19.50 2,026.86
(9,510.00)
37.50 149.67
(738.97)
1.00 886.82
(6,763.99)
14.00 1,881.45
(8,800.11)
25.50
Other characteristics of the firm:
Firm’s size (No of employees) 23,886.24
(56,356.00)
5,558.00 18,455.63
(38,545.66)
5,808.00 36,557.67
(83,538.22)
5,000.00 15,723.75
(37,876.00)
4,000.00 29,797.01
(66,155.51)
8,901.00
Multinational (Yes=1;
No=0)
0.52 (0.50) 1.00 0.47 (0.50) 0.00 0.62 (0.49) 1.00 0.39 (0.49) 0.00 0.60 (0.49) 1.00
Exports (Yes=1; No=0) 0.87 (0.34) 1.00 0.91 (0.29) 1.00 0.77 (0.43) 1.00 0.90 (0.30) 1.00 0.84 (0.37) 1.00
Outstanding Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR)
(Yes= 1; No=0)
0.18 (0.39) 0.00 0.21 (0.41) 0.00 0.12 (0.32) 0.00 0.20 (0.40) 0.00 0.16 (0.37) 0.00
Family business tradition
(Years)
29.68 (39.06) 15.00 30.11 (36.92) 18.50 28.67 (43.95) 6.00 25.20 (33.02) 11.00 32.91 (42.75) 23.00
Business leader’s personal traits:
Age at entry (Years) 30.01 (7.68) 29.00 29.45 (7.34) 28.00 31.32 (8.32) 30.00 27.75 (5.48) 27.00 31.65 (8.59) 30.00
Founder (Yes= 1; No=0) 0.53 (0.50) 1.00 0.51 (0.50) 1.00 0.55 (0.50) 1.00 0.57 (0.50) 1.00 0.49 (0.50) 0.00
Similar previous sector
(Yes= 1; No=0)
0.84 (0.37) 1.00 0.85 (0.36) 1.00 0.82 (0.39) 1.00 0.88 (0.33) 1.00 0.81 (0.39) 1.00
College studies (Yes= 1;
No=0)
0.26 (0.44) 0.00 0.25 (0.43) 0.00 0.28 (0.45) 0.00 0.17 (0.37) 0.00 0.33 (0.47) 0.00
Apprenticeship (Yes= 1;
No=0)
0.34 (0.47) 0.00 0.36 (0.48) 0.00 0.28 (0.45) 0.00 0.43 (0.50) 0.00 0.28 (0.45) 0.00
Inventor (Yes= 1; No=0) 0.21 (0.40) 0.00 0.23 (0.42) 0.00 0.15 (0.36) 0.00 0.24 (0.43) 0.00 0.18 (0.39) 0.00
High social background
(Yes= 1; No=0)
0.14 (0.34) 0.00 0.11 (0.32) 0.00 0.18 (0.39) 0.00 0.08 (0.28) 0.00 0.17 (0.38) 0.00
No of observations 200 140 60 84 116
Standard Errors (S.E.) in brackets.
22 Strictly speaking, Schumpeter established only five types of innovation as he con-
sidered marketing innovations to be a kind of process innovation; but he clearly granted a
singularity to the former by saying that a new process “can also exist in a new way of
handling a commodity commercially” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 66). Thus, in our classifi-
cation we have differentiated new industrial processes from new marketing methods, in
the same way as Ruef (2002, p. 436).
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innovations are clearly more complex technically than non-patented
ones. Hence, it seems interesting to test whether there is a differential
effect of each type of innovation on firm survival. Of course, the matter
is more complex as there are innovations not patented deliberately (see
Cohen et al., 2000). In any case, the most important concern for us is
not whether the innovations are patented or not, but rather to take both
patented and non-patented significant innovations into account.
Otherwise, if only patented (or non-patented) innovations were con-
sidered, the firms’ innovation activity would be undervalued. As we
have been able to gather both types, our data on significant innovations
can be considered, with its limitations (see below), a comprehensive
indicator of the firms’ innovation activity.
In all, the database contains 523 significant innovations,23 a sample
of which is displayed in Table 3. Obviously, the information provided
by the DBB is limited, so it probably does not include all the innovations
introduced by the selected firms. Nevertheless, we assume that it does
not omit their ‘significant innovations’, that is, those particularly im-
portant for the firms’ performance. The average number of significant
innovations by firm is 2.7, as shown in Table 2, which also shows the
differences in innovativeness by groups of companies and types of in-
novation. But it is important to point out that the firms’ innovativeness
according to this indicator is far from homogeneous as it varies from not
having introduced any significant innovation (10.5% of the firms) to
having developed between 6 and 7 (7%) as shown in Table 4. On the
other hand, the average number of significant innovations was 2.61 for
the firms entering from 1816 to 1875 and 2.69 for those entering from
1876 to 1957 (see Table 2). It is certain that the contrary happens ac-
cording with their median value (3 and 2 respectively), but when the
significant innovations are divided by types, their medians are by and
large similar for both groups (and clearly greater for the second one in
non-patented innovations). In brief, the firms entering before 1875 do
not seem to have had advantages in adopting innovations compared to
those entering later on.24 That is, an automatic positive relation be-
tween significant innovations and survival does not seem plausible a
priori for our data.
The significant innovations are arguably the most important ones,
but they are very few compared to all the innovations the firms have
developed throughout their lifetime. Although mostly incremental,
these other innovations may have been on the whole more important
for the firms’ performance than the few significant (radical in some
cases) ones, as has been discussed in Section 2. Thus, it is worth in-
cluding them in the analysis. There is not a source from which to obtain
that information, but the overall number of patents applied for by the
selected firms can be taken as a rough measure of their more ordinary
(incremental) innovative effort. This can be maintained on the basis
that the great majority of patents reflect minor inventions and that
many of them are never implemented. In any case, most of them reflect
at least certain innovation activity, and even those not implemented
may be of some help for later technical developments. It is certain,
though, that some patents reflect major inventions, but they are a very
small proportion of all the patents registered (e.g., Pakes, 1986; Cohen
and Levin, 1989; Trajtenberg et al., 1997), no more than 1% according
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23 Their distribution according with Schumpeter’s typology is: 217 product innovations
(41.5%), 144 process innovations (27.5%), 71 marketing innovations (13.6%), 65 orga-
nizational ones (12.4%), and 26 new sources of supply and new markets (5%). Regarding
the second classification criterion, 194 (37%) were patented, while 329 (63%) were not.
Thirdly, only 80 (15%) innovations were imported from abroad, so the great majority of
them (85%) had domestic origin. This indicates −not surprisingly– a very low foreign
technological dependence of the British business elite. For a more detailed analysis of the
523 innovations, see Ortiz-Villajos (2017).
24 This is not surprising given that breakthrough innovations are mostly introduced
around the entry date. In any case, all the firms in our database have had the possibility of
surviving throughout at least five decades up to 2013, so all them have had great chances
to innovate. Klepper and Simons (2005) have found a positive relation between early
entry and innovation, but their study is not comparable with ours as they focus on
companies specialized in four specific products competing between them.
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to several studies (e.g., Arts et al., 2012; Squicciarini et al., 2013;
Verhoeven et al., 2013). In addition, the total number of patents is an
aggregate indicator in which a radical innovation has the same weight
as an incremental one. Hence, if the latter represent more than 99% of
the patents, the overall number of patents not weighted by their value
can more plausibly be taken as an indicator of the firms’ incremental
innovation.
In order to obtain this indicator we have resorted to the historical da-
tabase of the European Patent Office (Espacenet), which contains in-
formation about the patents registered worldwide from 1836 to this day.
Thus, the total number of patents registered by each of the selected firms
from about 1836–2011 has been used as the indicator of their incremental
innovation activity.25 As shown in Table 2, the average number of patent
applications by firm is 1,463,26 much bigger than the average of significant
innovations (2.7). But, as happens with the latter, the selected firms’ in-
novativeness in terms of the overall number of patents is very variable, the
range going from not having any patent to having more than 10,000 (see
Table 4).27 In addition, the firms entering in the second period (1876–1957)
registered on average more patents than those entering before 1876 (see
Table 2). Hence, a necessarily positive relation (a problem of endogeneity)
between innovation and survival can neither be inferred a priori from this
second innovation indicator.
4.2. Control variables
Many studies have found a positive effect of firm size on the probability
of survival (e.g., Evans, 1987; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Geroski, 1995; Cefis
and Marsili, 2005), so we have controlled for this factor in our analysis. As
we are analyzing long-lasting companies, the initial size is less relevant than
the size they achieved later on given that the former does not reflect the
firm’s ability to adapt to changing conditions. Hence, the specific variable
used here is the maximum size achieved28 by the firms in terms of number
of employees; the ‘total world employment’ (Pavitt, 1984, p. 345), to be
more precise. There are important differences in size among the selected
firms (from fewer than 1,000 employees to more than 50,000),29 the
average being 23,886 employees (Table 2). This is another sign of the
outstanding performance of the firms under study as very few companies
anywhere achieve such dimensions. In fact, ‘fewer than 10 per cent of new
organizations ever grow on any dimension, and fewer than 4 per cent of
new organizations add more than 100 employees during their lifetimes’
(Shane, 2003, p. 6).
The international dimension of the firm −measured either by its
exporting activity or by its multinational presence– has also been found
influential on business survival by several studies, although with con-
flicting results (e.g., Esteve-Pérez et al., 2004, 2008; Giovannetti et al.,
2011). In order to control for this factor, we have included two dummy
variables: one distinguishing between exporting (value 1) and non-ex-
porting companies (value 0) and the other between firms with foreign
branches (multinationals)30 (value 1) and those only established in
Britain (value 0).
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has received increasing at-
tention in the last years both from business and academic spheres. One
of the reasons is the perception of its positive effect on business stability
and performance, although the empirical evidence is mixed (Orlitzky,
2008; Carroll and Shabana, 2010). Most studies on the matter have
focused on financial performance rather than on business survival, but
it is worth exploring whether the latter is influenced by CSR. To control
for this, we have included a dummy variable which takes the value one
for the firms with an outstanding concern for their employees and/or
their social environment and zero otherwise.
Business tradition or previous experience has been considered as a
factor possibly influencing survival by several studies (e.g., Carroll
et al., 1996; Klepper, 2002; Thomson, 2005). Some of our firms had no
tradition at the time of entry, while others did, so we have considered it
relevant to include this factor as another control variable. In particular,
the variable included is the number of years of family business tradition
before entry (in logarithms), the average being 29.7 years, with a slight
variation between manufacturing and services (Table 2).
In addition to firm-level variables, business survival literature has
also paid attention to the personal characteristics of the business lea-
ders/founders as factors influencing the firms’ longevity. Thus, we have
also included seven of those features as control variables in our ana-
lysis. Namely, the business leader’s age at the time of founding (or
entering) the company; whether he was the founder or not; whether his
previous activity was in a similar sector to that of the firm; whether he
had college studies or not; whether he was trained through an ap-
prenticeship; whether he was an inventor or not; and whether he came
from a high social background or not. All the mentioned variables are
defined as dummies except the first one, age at entry, which has been
taken in logarithms.31 The empirical literature has found conflicting
Table 4
Firms’ distribution by significant innovations and total patent applications.
Firms entering in
1816–1875
Firms entering in
1876–1957
All firms
Number % Number % Number %
Significant innovations by firm
0 innovations 12 14.3 9 7.8 21 10.5
1–3
innovations
45 53.6 76 65.5 121 60.5
4–5
innovations
24 28.6 20 17.2 44 22.0
6–7
innovations
3 3.6 11 9.5 14 7.0
All firms 84 100.0 116 100.0 200 100.0
Total patent applications by firm
0 patents 24 28.6 26 22.4 50 25.0
1–20 patents 25 29.8 31 26.7 56 28.0
21–100 patents 15 17.9 22 19.0 37 18.5
101–1000
patents
16 19.0 20 17.2 36 18.0
1001-10,000
patents
3 3.6 14 12.1 17 8.5
More than
10,000
patents
1 1.2 3 2.6 4 2.0
All firms 84 100.0 116 100.0 200 100.0
25 When the number of patents registered by one firm is very high −more than 1,000
or so–, the figure obtained is approximate because in those cases the on-line database
(Espacenet) does not easily allow us to go through all the patents in order to detect
possible duplicates.
26 There being a great difference between manufacturing (2,026 patents) and services
(149 patents). The median value (18 patents for the whole set of firms) also reflects a
great difference between industries: 38 patents for manufacturing and only 1 for services
(Table 2).
27 Given the high variation in the number of patents among firms, in order to soften
such heterogeneity we have taken this variable in logarithms. In fact, this variable follows
a log-normal distribution.
28 The usual alternative to the initial size as predictor of the probability of survival is
the current size (e.g., Mata et al., 1995; Esteve-Pérez et al., 2004; Cefis and Marsili, 2005;
Tsvetkova et al., 2014), but it is not fitting (neither available) in our case as we do not
have a panel data set. Thus, in the absence of a better alternative, we decided to use the
maximum size because not including any size variable in the model would have been
worse from the point of view of the econometric modeling given the great range of sizes
among our selected firms.
29 Because of the great heterogeneity between the smallest and the biggest company,
we have taken this variable in logarithms as with the previous one.
30 An alternative indicator for the firm’s multinational presence is its Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), which is the one used by Giovannetti et al. (2011).
31 This will allow us to capture a possible non-linear effect of the founder/leader’s age
on business survival as has been frequently noticed for other performance indicators
(Shane, 2003, pp. 89–91). Another way to capture this effect is by including both the age
and the age squared in the model (see Ugur et al., 2016, Table 1, for some references on
this).
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results in relation with most of these variables (e.g., Vivarelli and
Audretsch, 1998; Klepper, 2002; Headd, 2003; Arribas and Vila, 2007;
Saridakis et al., 2008), so we aim to add some new evidence in one way
or the other.
4.3. Empirical model
The dependent variable in our analysis is the firm’s longevity
measured in years from foundation/entry to exit up to 2013 (see
Section 3 for details). If LONGEVITY≥ 0 denotes the duration of a
company, the cumulative distribution function of the variable is defined
as:
F (t)= Prob [LONGEVITY≤ t]
for t≥ 0, where t is a specific value of LONGEVITY. The ‘survivor
function’ of the company is defined as:
S (t)= 1–F (t)= Prob [LONGEVITY> t]
which measures the survival probability of the company after year t.
The final aim is to estimate the influence of innovation and the other
variables previously defined on the probability of survival of the com-
panies under study. According with this, we have opted for a parametric
duration (or survival) model. A non-parametric one would be less fit-
ting in our case because such models are more suitable when not much
is known about the sample and covariates, reason why these models do
not have a structure specified a priori. That is, they make no assump-
tions about the probability distribution of the endogenous variable and
the number of parameters; and the nature of their coefficients is very
flexible. For instance, non-parametric methods are appropriate when
using ranked variables with a not precise numerical interpretation, as
when assessing preferences. In our case, all the variables are continuous
or dummies, none of them being ordinal.32 Another possibility would
be a semi-parametric model, like the Cox proportional hazard one. But
this is neither useful for us because the hazard of exit of our companies
for different values of the independent variables is not proportional
over time (see Appendix C),33 this being a basic assumption of the Cox
model.
In brief, the use of a parametric model is more adequate in our case
because we want to test the dependency between the probability of
survival and a series of measurable characteristics both of the firm and
of its business leader. This relation is established by a vector of para-
meters which are estimated by maximum likelihood with censorship,
and which reflect the partial effect of each (explanatory or control)
variable on the probability of survival of the company throughout time.
In the parametric duration models it is necessary to assume a specific
density function for the dependent variable, normally chosen between
the exponential, Weibull, log-normal, gamma or log-logistic ones (see
Wooldridge, 2010 for details).
Although each study has its peculiarities, in general terms, the ex-
ponential distribution supposes a survival probability (or a hazard of exit)
constant throughout time, and the Weibull one, an increasing or decreasing
probability of survival (or hazard of exit) with time, depending on the value
of one of the parameters characterizing that distribution. At first glance, the
two mentioned behaviors do not seem plausible for our data (see Tables 1
and 2), but we have checked this statistically. Following Cleves et al. (2016),
various simple contrasts based on the characteristic parameters of the
gamma distribution −k and Log (beta)– have been made, them providing
evidence against the use of both the exponential and the Weibull distribu-
tions in all our estimations.34 In fact, our dependent variable (Longevity)
follows a gamma (k, beta) distribution, with a p-value of 0.09 at 5% and 1%
of significance.
But the gamma is very similar to the log-normal distribution (except in
the width of the tails), and both are equally used in many empirical ap-
plications for several reasons: both are non-negative and positively skewed
and they have a constant coefficient of variation (Fu and Moncher, 2004);
they have similar shapes (see Cho et al., 2004); both of them are useful
when the dependent variable is skewed to the right, as happens with ours,
which has an asymmetry coefficient of 0.36; and it is well known that as the
k parameter increases, the gamma distribution converges to a log-normal
(see Johnson et al., 1994). An advantage of the log-normal is that it is easy
to understand as it is related to the normal one and fits very well data with
large skewness. In addition, it is slightly more stable than the gamma in
presence of outliers in the sample, as is our case, where there are, for in-
stance, a few companies with more than 50,000 employees or with more
than 10,000 patents. But it has the disadvantage that its coefficients need
volatility adjustment, although this problem can be solved by calculating
the parameters’ standard errors in a robust way, as we have done. In brief,
both the gamma and log-normal distributions seem to be suitable for the
present case. In fact, the results obtained to predict the expected value of the
endogenous variable and the profile of the resultant residuals confirm that
both are adequate and very similar. As it is difficult to discriminate between
them (see subsection 5.1), we have used both in the analysis.
As we do not have information from 2013 onwards, we cannot
observe the complete duration of the companies that continued in op-
eration after that year, so our data are right-censored to 2013.35 Thus, it
is necessary to define a censoring variable. In this case, we have defined
a dummy which takes the value one if the observed duration is com-
plete (firms exited before 2013) and zero otherwise.
5. Econometric analysis and results
This section is divided in three parts. Subsection 5.1 explains the con-
trasts used to discriminate between the log-normal and the gamma dis-
tributions. Subsection 5.2 presents the results of our estimations. Firstly, to
get the general pattern, the results for all the companies of the data set are
presented (Table 5). Then, in order to control for industry differences, we
show the results for the manufacturing firms from one side (Table 6) and for
the service ones from the other (Table 7). All the three estimations include
four different specifications depending on the level of disaggregation of the
significant innovations: (1) without disaggregation, and disaggregated (2)
by Schumpeterian forms, (3) by patented and non-patented and (4) by
domestic and imported. In each specification, we have included the esti-
mations according with both the log-normal and the gamma distributions.
The tables show only the preferred models.36 The complete ones, estimated
32 In addition, in non-parametric models, the consistency of the maximum likelihood
estimator of the model’s parameters depends on the sample size, which must be suffi-
ciently large, certainly larger than ours, even if the standard errors of the parameters are
calculated in a robust way as we have done. For a useful memorandum about non-
parametric estimation of duration models, see Zhang (2003).
33 Appendix C includes various pairs of smoothed hazard functions over time, each one
corresponding to a different value of a covariate of the model (e.g., being a multinational
company versus an only national-based one). When the two curves are not parallel, as
happens in our case, the hazard rate is not proportional over time and, consequently, the
Cox proportional hazard model is not adequate (see, for example, Cleves et al., 2016).
34 The result of the contrast of the null hypothesis that the parameter k=1 against the
alternative that k ≠ 1, confirms that our data do not support the Weibull distribution.
And the result of the joint contrast that k=1 and Log (beta)=0, with a p-value=0.000,
goes against the hypothesis of a constant hazard of exit over time; that is, against the
exponential distribution.
35 As the significant innovations have been recorded from the DBB, published in 1984-
86, the information on this variable is previous to c. 1985. Thus, we have estimated the
models also right-censored to 1985, assuming that there can be relevant missing in-
formation on the companies’ innovation activity from that year to 2013. The results of
these models are quite similar to those right-censored to 2013 (this being an indication of
the long-lasting effect of innovation), so we have not included them in the tables. The few
significant differences will be pointed out opportunely.
36 These are achieved by the usual procedure. Firstly, the less significant variable (the
one with the highest p-value) of the complete model is eliminated; then, the model
without that variable is re-estimated and the less significant variable, eliminated; and so
on. This iterative process ends when all the variables are individually significant at least
at the 10% level. In addition, the information criteria (AIC and BIC) are used to dis-
criminate adequately between the complete model and the preferred (or final) one.
J.M. Ortiz-Villajos, S. Sotoca Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
8
with all the explanatory and control variables, can be consulted in Appendix
B. In order to be more specific about the effect of the variables, we have
calculated −from the models in Tables 5 to 7– the predicted difference in
the firm’s longevity (in years) when, ceteris paribus, a variable takes the
median value37 compared to its opposite (or its maximum or minimum
value when the variable is not a dummy) (Table 8). Lastly, some evidence
on the robustness of the analysis is presented in subsection 5.3, firstly, by
estimating the same duration models for the firms entering before and after
1875 (Table 9) in order to test a potential endogeneity problem; and, sec-
ondly, by checking both graphically and statistically the properties of the
Cox-Snell residuals resultant from the models using the log-normal dis-
tribution (Fig. 2 and Table 10).
5.1. Discrimination between the log-normal and the gamma distribution
As has been said, our data seem a priori to fit well both the gamma
and the log-normal distributions, but is it possible to discriminate in
favour of one or the other? In order to check this, five discriminatory
measures have been calculated.
The two parameters designed as sigma (the standard error) and k
(the shape parameter) are characteristic of the log-normal and the
gamma distributions respectively. If, according with the p-value, the
null hypothesis that k is equal to zero against the alternative that it is
different from zero is not rejected, then the result of this contrast sug-
gests that the log-normal distribution would be more adequate in our
Table 5
Results of the log-normal and gamma duration models for business survival (MLE): All firms (A) (preferred models).
A1 A2 A3 A4
Lognormal Gamma Lognormal Gamma Lognormal Gamma Lognormal Gamma
Constant 5.786***
(0.000)
5.785***
(0.000)
5.736***
(0.000)
5.813***
(0.000)
5.630***
(0.000)
5.671***
(0.000)
5.830***
(0.000)
5.817***
(0.000)
Significant Innovations (SI) 0.043**
(0.029)
0.034*
(0.094)
– – – – – –
SI by Schumpeterian forms:
New Product – – – – – –
New Process – – 0.106***
(0.002)
0.094***
(0.006)
– – – –
Organizational – – – – – –
Marketing – – – – – –
New Market – – – – – –
New Source – – – – – –
Patented/Non-patented SI:
Patented SI (in log) – – – – – –
Non-patented SI (in log) – – – – 0.153**
(0.033)
0.114
(0.106)
– –
Domestic/Foreign SI:
Domestic SI – – – – – – 0.044**
(0.036)
0.035*
(0.090)
Imported SI – – – – – –
Total patent applications (in log)
Firm’s size (in log) 0.088***
(0.002)
0.083***
(0.001)
0.097***
(0.000)
0.089***
(0.001)
0.088***
(0.001)
0.085***
(0.001)
0.090***
(0.001)
0.084***
(0.001)
Multinational 0.194**
(0.015)
0.193**
(0.012)
0.199**
(0.011)
0.190***
(0.009)
0.186**
(0.022)
0.181**
(0.022)
0.200**
(0.013)
0.200***
(0.009)
Exports
Outstanding CSR
Family business tradition (in log) 0.042**
(0.034)
0.038**
(0.041)
0.034*
(0.084)
0.035*
(0.058)
0.035*
(0.072)
0.035*
(0.067)
0.041**
(0.037)
0.038**
(0.046)
Business leader’s personal traits:
Age at founding (in log) −0.727***
(0.000)
−0.677***
(0.000)
−0.722***
(0.000)
−0.685***
(0.000)
−0.680***
(0.000)
−0.645***
(0.000)
−0.743***
(0.000)
−0.685***
(0.000)
Founder
Similar previous sector
College studies
Apprenticeship
Inventor
High social background
No of observations 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Sigma 0.502
(0.021) se
0.497
(0.027) se
0.502
(0.026) se
0.502
(0.028) se
K 0.451
(0.033)
0.520
(0.036)
0.434
(0.085)
0.461
(0.051)
Log (beta) −0.762
(0.000)
−0.789
(0.000)
−0.756
(0.000)
−0.764
(0.000)
LogL (optimum) −146.465 −144.594 −143.954 −141.739 −145.988 −144.490 −146.598 −144.670
AIC 306.930 305.180 301.910 299.480 305.980 304.990 307.200 305.340
BIC 330.020 331.570 324.990 325.870 329.060 331.380 330.290 331.720
Notes: MLE: exact maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. P-value in brackets (except for the Sigma parameter, for which the figure in brackets is
the standard error). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10% (p< 0.1), 5% (p< 0.05) and 1% (p< 0.01) respectively. Sigma is the parameter which
characterizes the standard error (se) in a log-normal distribution. K and Log (beta) are respectively the shape and the scale parameter in a gamma distribution. LogL
(optimum) is the value of the likelihood function in the optimum (in logarithms). AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. BIC is the Bayesian Information Criterion.
37 The median is a better reference than the mean when the variables are highly dis-
persed – as happens in the present case (see Table 2) – because, contrary to the mean, the
median is not affected by the presence of a few firms with a very high (or low) value in
any of the control variables.
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case (see Cleves et al., 2016). According with this, for instance, the log-
normal distribution would be preferable to the gamma in the four
models including all the firms (Table 5).
The other three measures provided are very usual in the estimation
by maximum likelihood of any econometric model. The first one (LogL)
is the value of the likelihood function in the optimum (in logarithms),
which in our case is always better −although very slightly– for the
models based on the gamma distribution. The second one is the Akaike
information criterion (AIC), which discriminates in favour of the
gamma distribution for the models including all the companies or the
manufacturing ones (Tables 5 and 6) and in favour of the log-normal for
the other two cases (Tables 7 and 9). The third one is the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC), which discriminates in favour of the log-
normal distribution in the first two groups of models (Tables 5 and 6)
and in favour of the gamma in the second ones (Tables 7 and 9). In any
case, the numerical value of the three mentioned discriminatory criteria
is always very similar.
In sum, the mentioned measures and the coefficients and statistical
significance of the models estimated assuming the log-normal and
gamma distributions, displayed in Tables 5–9, confirm the similarity
and adequacy of both of them. In some cases and marginally it is pos-
sible to discriminate in favour of one or the other, and that could be
useful depending on the objective of the analysis. But on the whole and
for the present case both of them seem valid. As famously remarked,
when working with real data, “all models are wrong” (Box, 1976, p.
792). Hence, for reasons of transparency (and because the estimation
based on the gamma does not converge in one specification),38 we have
calculated and presented our estimations according with both dis-
tributions.
5.2. Results of the duration models estimated
A first piece of evidence from the analysis of the overall set of firms
(Table 5) is that the innovation activity measured by significant innova-
tions (SI) in aggregated terms (specification A1) is positively and
Table 6
Results of the log-normal and gamma duration models for business survival (MLE): Manufacturing firms only (B) (preferred models).
B1 B2 B3 & B4(a)
Lognormal Gamma Lognormal Gamma Lognormal Gamma
Constant 5.383***
(0.000)
5.650***
(0.000)
5.259***
(0.000)
5.512***
(0.000)
5.383***
(0.000)
5.650***
(0.000)
Significant Innovations (SI) – – – –
SI by Schumpeterian forms:
New Product – – – –
New Process – – 0.083***
(0.010)
0.070**
(0.035)
– –
Organizational – – – –
Marketing – – – –
New Market – – – –
New Source – – – –
Patented/Non-patented SI:
Patented SI (in log) – – – –
Non-patented SI (in log) – – – –
Domestic/Foreign SI:
Domestic SI – – – –
Imported SI – – – –
Total patent applications (in log) 0.029*
(0.080)
0.028*
(0.085)
0.029*
(0.080)
0.028*
(0.085)
Firm’s size (in log) 0.080**
(0.046)
0.069**
(0.048)
0.114***
(0.000)
0.101***
(0.001)
0.081**
(0.046)
0.069**
(0.048)
Multinational
Exports
Outstanding CSR 0.211***
(0.006)
0.154*
(0.065)
0.186**
(0.014)
0.129
(0.143)
0.211***
(0.006)
0.154*
(0.065)
Family business tradition (in log)
Business leader’s personal traits:
Age at founding (in log) −0.548***
(0.005)
−0.563***
(0.001)
−0.582***
(0.002)
−0.589***
(0.001)
−0.548***
(0.005)
−0.563***
(0.001)
Founder
Similar previous sector
College studies
Apprenticeship
Inventor
High social background
No of observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
Sigma 0.457
(0.033) se
0.454
(0.030) se
0.457
(0.036) se
K 0.487
(0.061)
0.478
(0.138)
0.487
(0.060)
Log (beta) −0.863
(0.000)
−0.863
(0.000)
−0.864
(0.000)
LogL (optimum) −91.917 −91.128 −90.942 −89.620 −91.917 −90.128
AIC 195.830 194.260 193.880 193.240 195.830 194.260
BIC 213.490 214.850 211.530 213.830 213.480 214.850
Notes: see Table 5. (a) B3 and B4 preferred models are coincident.
38 The maximum likelihood estimation of Model C2 using the gamma distribution does
not converge, while it does when using the log-normal (see Table 7). It must be high-
lighted that we have used both Stata and Gretl to estimate the models and both programs
give the same exact results in all cases.
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significantly (at the 5% level with the log-normal and at the 10% with the
gamma) related with the probability of business survival. It shows an in-
novation premium in line with the findings by Cefis and Marsili (2006)
and other studies (see Section 2). When the significant innovations are
disaggregated by types, their relevance is confirmed, but in a more
nuanced way as not all types are found to be influential. In particular, only
new process innovations (specification A2), non-patented (A3) and do-
mestic ones (A4) seem to affect positively and significantly (between the
1% and the 10% level depending on the type of innovation and the dis-
tribution used) the probability of survival. According with our calcula-
tions, a company with the median amount of significant innovations of the
aforementioned types would survive, ceteris paribus, between 6.4 and 9.4
years more than a firm without any one, looking jointly at the estimations
based on the log-normal and the gamma distributions (Table 8). On the
contrary, the innovation activity measured by total patent applications
shows no relation with the firms’ survival probability in any of the four
specifications. According with this, it could be said that for the overall set
of firms, survival depends more on important innovations (SI) than on
incremental ones (total patents).
That new process, non-patented and domestic significant innovations
are the most influential types of innovation on business survival compared
with their corresponding counterparts (i.e., new product, patented and
imported innovations) is an interesting finding, but how to explain it? This
would require a detailed analysis of the innovations and companies, which
exceeds the object of the present study. Some hypothetical explanations
can be suggested, though. The influence of process innovations could be
explained by their increasing importance over time for the competitive-
ness of companies relative to product ones, as the product life cycle theory
indicates (Vernon, 1966; Utterback and Suárez, 1993). Klepper and
Simons (2005, p. 41) have found some empirical evidence on the
Table 7
Results of the log-normal and gamma duration models for business survival (MLE): Service firms only (C) (preferred models).
C1 C2 C3 C4
Lognormal Gamma Lognormal Gamma(a) Lognormal Gamma Lognormal Gamma
Constant 7.326***
(0.000)
7.268***
(0.000)
4.999***
(0.000)
6.555***
(0.000)
6.430***
(0.000)
4.703***
(0.000)
4.708***
(0.000)
Significant Innovations (SI) 0.090*
(0.064)
0.090*
(0.067)
– – – – –
SI by Schumpeterian frms:
New Product – – 0.128*
(0.084)
– – – –
New Process – – – – – –
Organizational – – – – – –
Marketing – – −0.187**
(0.047)
– – – –
New Market – – – – – –
New Source – – – – – –
Patented/Non-patented SI:
Patented SI (in log) – – – – –
Non-patented SI (in log) – – – – –
Domestic/Foreign SI:
Domestic SI – – – – – 0.088*
(0.100)
0.087
(0.157)
Imported SI – – – – – 0.372**
(0.017)
0.327
(0.146)
Total patent applications (in log)
Firm’s size (in log) 0.118***
(0.003)
0.080*
(0.068)
0.079*
(0.051)
0.107***
(0.009)
0.109**
(0.017)
Multinational 0.561***
(0.000)
0.573***
(0.000)
0.441***
(0.002)
0.491***
(0.001)
0.526***
(0.001)
0.342**
(0.033)
0.348*
(0.076)
Exports −0.341*
(0.059)
−0.342*
(0.061)
−0.415**
(0.017)
−0.332**
(0.046)
−0.297*
(0.067)
Outstanding CSR
Family business tradition (in log) 0.081*
(0.058)
0.086**
(0.034)
Business leader’s personal traits:
Age at founding (in log) −0.985***
(0.003)
−0.949***
(0.003)
−0.608**
(0.012)
−0.870***
(0.003)
−0.808***
(0.005)
−0.648**
(0.013)
−0.645**
(0.016)
Founder
Similar previous sector 0.361*
(0.074)
0.537**
(0.049)
0.523
(0.173)
College studies
Apprenticeship
Inventor
High social background 0.438**
(0.034)
0.387*
(0.080)
0.421**
(0.030)
0.377*
(0.077)
0.384
(0.104)
No of observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Sigma 0.549
(0.062) se
0.504
(0.048) se
0.553
(0.057) se
0.524 (0.047) se
K 0.331
(0.307)
0.570
(0.123)
0.060
(0.941)
Log (beta) −0.652
(0.000)
−0.706
(0.000)
−0.652
(0.000)
LogL (optimum) −47.732 −47.374 −42.881 −40.099 −47.300 −44.807 −44.803
AIC 109.460 110.750 107.760 110.100 110.590 107.610 109.610
BIC 124.120 127.500 130.800 124.760 127.340 126.460 130.550
Notes: see Table 5. (a) The MLE estimation does not converge in this case.
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increasing attention to process innovation in a few specific industries over
time. It is less clear why non-patented significant innovations are more
influential than patented ones. A plausible explanation is that non-pa-
tented innovations are normally very specific to their developers and not
easy to replicate, this giving them a sustained competitive advantage. On
the other hand, patented innovations are replicable by definition, fre-
quently licensed and, in any case, ever more difficult to maintain under
the inventor’s control, so the advantages they provide to the inventor tend
to diminish over time. Thirdly, the advantages of domestic innovations
compared, ceteris paribus, to imported ones (such as lead time, better
adaptation to local conditions, or greater potentiality and versatility as
their know-how belongs to the firm) seem a reasonable explanation of
their greater influence on survival.
In relation with the other five characteristics of the firm included in the
model, the firm’s size appear to have a positive and highly significant
effect (at the 1% level) on the probability of survival in all the four spe-
cifications both with the log-normal and the gamma distributions, the
median company surviving some 30 years more than the smallest one
Table 8
Predicted difference in the firm’s longevity when the independent variable takes the median value compared to its opposite (maximum or minimum) value (from the
models in Tables 5–7)(a).
Independent variable Specification Value of the independent variable Difference in survival time in favor of the median firm (years)
Median Opposite/max-min Log-normal Gamma
All firms (A)
Significant Innovations (SI) A1 2 0 7.24 6.38
New process SI A2 0 1 −9.43 −9.27
Non-patented SI (in log) A3 0.69 0 8.91 7.45
Domestic SI A4 2 0 7.71 6.79
Firm’s size (in log) A1 8.62 3.91 30.06 31.94
Firm’s size (in log) A2 8.62 3.91 34.46 32.56
Firm’s size (in log) A3 8.62 3.91 30.06 32.28
Firm’s size (in log) A4 8.62 3.91 31.37 32.82
Multinational A1 yes no 15.68 17.29
Multinational A2 yes no 12.52 12.24
Multinational A3 yes no 15.07 16.24
Multinational A4 yes no 16.47 18.20
Family business tradition (in log) A1 2.77 0 9.65 9.99
Family business tradition (in log) A2 2.77 0 7.55 8.81
Family business tradition (in log) A3 2.77 0 8.14 8.89
Family business tradition (in log) A4 2.77 0 9.71 9.92
Age at founding (in log) A1 3.37 4.04 34.50 35.94
Age at founding (in log) A2 3.37 4.04 32.60 35.20
Age at founding (in log) A3 3.37 4.04 32.68 34.54
Age at founding (in log) A4 3.37 4.04 35.81 36.95
Manufacturing firms only (B)
New process SI B2 0 1 −6.39 −6.06
Total patent applications (in log) B1, B3, B4 3.65 0 7.84 8.50
Firm’s size (in log) B1, B3, B4 8.67 5.30 18.55 18.14
Firm’s size (in log) B2 8.67 5.30 23.51 24.07
Outstanding CSR B1, B3, B4 no yes −18.37 −14.60
Outstanding CSR B2 no yes −15.13 −11.5
Age at founding (in log) B1, B4 3.33 3.97 23.08 24.49
Age at founding (in log) B2 3.33 3.97 22.95 26.23
Age at founding (in log) B3 3.33 3.97 36.15 26.36
Services firms only (C)
Significant Innovations (SI) C1 2 0 15.14 16.57
New product SI C2 0 1 −10.30 (b)
New process SI C2 0 1 −14.25 (b)
Domestic SI C4 2 0 14.10 14.16
Imported SI C4 0 1 −39.37 −38.68
Firm’s size (in log) C2 8.52 3.91 31.50 (b)
Firm’s size (in log) C3 8.52 3.91 25.90 29.87
Firm’s size (in log) C4 8.52 3.91 34.10 34.95
Multinational C1 yes no 48.26 43.87
Multinational C2 yes no 26.86 (b)
Multinational C3 yes no 32.69 39.95
Multinational C4 yes no 25.30 26.00
Exports C1 yes no −37.52 −41.01
Exports C2 yes no −38.68 (b)
Exports C3 yes no −33.23 −33.86
Family business tradition (in log) C1 1.84 0 12.74 14.70
Age at founding (in log) C1 3.40 4.04 43.24 45.70
Age at founding (in log) C2 3.40 4.04 24.33 (b)
Age at founding (in log) C3 3.40 4.04 30.23 39.47
Age at founding (in log) C4 3.40 4.04 29.72 29.94
Similar previous sector C2 yes no 22.84 (b)
Similar previous sector C4 yes no 36.30 36.12
High social background C3 no yes −39.37 −54.42
High social background C4 no yes −39.98 −24.61
(a) The predictions conditioned to the median value of the x’s are calculated by the exp(x’b), where x is a vector of medians of the independent variables and b is the
vector of parameters estimated by MLE in the convergence (see Wooldridge, 2010).
(b) The MLE estimation does not converge for specification C2 when the gamma distribution is assumed for the endogenous variable.
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(Table 8). This shows the high relevance of size for business survival in line
with many other studies. Secondly, the multinational character of the firm
also has a positive and highly significant influence on the probability of
survival, coinciding with the findings by Giovannetti et al. (2011). In
quantitative terms, a multinational would survive, ceteris paribus, between
12 and 18 years more than a merely national-based company (Table 8).
Instead, the other international dimension, the exporting activity, shows
no influence at all on business survival, contrary to the results obtained by
Esteve-Pérez et al. (2004, 2008). On the other side, family business tra-
dition before entry has a positive and significant effect on the survival
probability, the median company (with 15 years of tradition) presumably
surviving between 7 and 10 years more than a firm without tradition
(Table 8). Thus, business tradition is a positive factor for longevity as other
studies have found (Vivarelli and Audretsch, 1998; Klepper, 2002;
Thomson, 2005; Fontana and Nesta, 2009). Lastly, having an outstanding
CSR does not seem to affect survival.
Among the seven business leader’s personal traits included in the
analysis, only one−the age at founding/entry– has a significant effect (at
the 1% level in all cases) on survival, negative in this case. This confirms
the expected non-linear effect of this factor on the business survival
probability. According with our calculations, the median company
(founded by a 29-year old entrepreneur as shown in Table 2) would sur-
vive between 32 and 37 years more than one founded by the most mature
entrepreneur (Table 8). This result is conflicting with some studies which
have found no relation between the founder’s age and firm survival
(Arribas and Vila, 2007; Saridakis et al., 2008),39 but is in line with others
showing a curvilinear effect of the entrepreneur’s age on business per-
formance in general (Shane, 2003, pp. 89–91). This can be explained by
the higher innovative/creative character of relatively young business
leaders compared to very young or very mature ones. On the other hand,
when we distinguish between business leaders that are founders and those
that are not, we do not find any significant differential effect on business
Table 9
Results of the log-normal and gamma duration models for business survival (MLE): Firms entering in 1816–1875 (D) and in 1876–1957 (E) (preferred models).
Entry period: 1816–1875 Entry period: 1876–1957
D1 D2 E1 E2
Lognormal Gamma Lognormal Gamma Lognormal Gamma Lognormal Gamma
Constant 3.630***
(0.000)
3.811***
(0.000)
3.637***
(0.000)
3.791***
(0.000)
5.444***
(0.000)
5.191***
(0.000)
5.564***
(0.000)
5.173***
(0.000)
Significant Innovations (SI) – – 0.089***
(0.002)
0.086***
(0.003)
– –
SI by Schumpeterian forms:
New Product – – – – 0.067*
(0.089)
0.076**
(0.047)
New Process – – – – 0.196***
(0.003)
0.179**
(0.012)
Organizational – – – – 0.140*
(0.072)
0.161**
(0.018)
Marketing – – – –
New Market – – – –
New Source – – 0.191**
(0.021)
0.149
(0.120)
– –
Total patent applications (in log) 0.057***
(0.003)
0.053**
(0.017)
0.060***
(0.002)
0.057**
(0.011)
Firm’s size (in log) 0.127***
(0.001)
0.111***
(0.001)
0.126***
(0.001)
0.112***
(0.001)
0.067**
(0.047)
0.068**
(0.034)
0.055*
(0.082)
0.056*
(0.060)
Multinational 0.292***
(0.003)
0.294***
(0.002)
0.283***
(0.003)
0.284***
(0.003)
0.213**
(0.033)
0.204**
(0.046)
0.206**
(0.030)
0.192**
(0.049)
Exports −0.401***
(0.004)
−0.366**
(0.017)
−0.417***
(0.003)
−0.384**
(0.013)
Outstanding CSR
Family business tradition (in log) 0.044*
(0.067)
0.045*
(0.051)
Business leader’s personal traits:
Age at founding (in log) −0.651***
(0.000)
−0.547***
(0.008)
−0.620***
(0.001)
−0.471**
(0.030)
Founder
Similar previous sector
College studies
Apprenticeship
Inventor −0.173*
(0.093)
−0.211**
(0.047)
−0.224*
(0.056)
−0.265**
(0.024)
High social background
No of observations 84 84 84 84 116 116 116 116
Sigma 0.408
(0.043) se
0.405
(0.044) se
0.463
(0.035) se
0.435
(0.033) se
K 0.381
(0.232)
0.330
(0.299)
0.434
(0.342)
0.560
(0.223)
Log (beta) −0.949
(0.000)
−0.947
(0.000)
−0.843
(0.000)
−0.876
(0.000)
LogL (optimum) −45.058 −44.119 −44.389 −43.658 −78.010 −77.448 −77.407 −76.391
AIC 102.120 102.240 102.770 103.320 172.190 172.900 172.810 172.780
BIC 116.700 119.250 119.790 122.760 194.230 197.680 197.600 200.320
Notes: see Table 5.
39 Headd (2003) has found that age is positive for survival in some cases, but negative
in others. In any case, this study is not comparable with ours as it is focused not on the
founder or key business leader but on the current owner of the company.
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survival. This result suggests that, when considering only relevant business
leaders (as is our case), being the founder is not what makes the difference,
at least in relation with the survival of the company.
The variables related with the leaders’ education −having college
studies or an apprenticeship– do not seem to have any influence on
business survival. This coincides with the findings of several studies
(e.g., Taylor, 1999; Arribas and Vila, 2007) but conflicts with others
(e.g., Headd, 2003; Saridakis et al., 2008).40 Nor is the entrepreneur
being an inventor or having a high social background relevant for the
firm’s probability of survival, these findings being specific contributions
of our research. Lastly, having worked in a similar sector before
founding/entering the company is not influential on survival either, this
conflicting with other studies (Klepper, 2002; Thomson, 2005; Arribas
and Vila, 2007; Fontana and Nesta, 2009). Nevertheless, this variable
(pre-entry experience) becomes significant when we split our data set
by sectors. The same happens with other factors −total patents, ex-
porting activity, CSR, and social background– not found significant for
the overall set of firms, as we shall show immediately.
When the same log-normal and gamma duration models are estimated
only for the manufacturing firms of the data set, some differences appear
(Table 6). First, while the SI as a whole do not seem to influence the
probability of survival of this group of firms, their overall patent appli-
cations affect it positively and significantly (specification B1). This result
−just the opposite of the one observed for all the firms (A1)– would in-
dicate that in manufacturing many incremental innovations (total patents)
are more important than some radical (SI) ones for business survival. The
fact that patents contain technologies predominantly related with manu-
facturing is probably another explanation for this result. When the SI are
disaggregated by patented and non-patented and domestic and imported
(B3 and B4 specifications), the same result is obtained; that is, none of the
SI types seem to influence survival, while total patent applications have a
positive and significant effect, the median company surviving about 8
years more than a firm without any patent according with our predictions
(Table 8). Nevertheless, when dividing the SI by Schumpeterian forms
(B2), new process innovations seem to influence positively and sig-
nificantly (at the 5% level both for log-normal and gamma models) the
probability of survival. A company with one significant process innovation
would survive, ceteris paribus, about 6 years more than a firm without any
one (Table 8). This is in line with the finding by Cefis and Marsili (2005)
that process innovations are the key ones for business survival in manu-
facturing. In this case, however, the preferred specification excludes the
overall number of patents, as if they were overshadowed by the SI (ra-
dical) new process innovations.41
Among the other characteristics of the firm, its size appears to influ-
ence business survival positively and significantly in the four specifications
(from B1 to B4) −the median company presumably surviving, ceteris
paribus, from 18 to 24 years more than the smallest one (Table 8)–, but not
the family business tradition nor the multinational character, both of
which did have a positive effect for the overall set of firms (Table 5). Thus,
the international expansion of the manufacturing companies −both by
creating branches abroad and by exporting– does not seem to influence
their survival. Instead, having an outstanding Corporate Social Responsi-
bility (CSR) seems to produce a highly positive and significant effect on
business survival in all the specifications (from B1 to B4), thus indicating
that social responsibility would be particularly relevant in manufacturing.
In fact, according with our estimations, a firm of that sector with out-
standing CSR would survive, ceteris paribus, between 11.5 and 18.4 years
more than one without it (Table 8).
In relation with the personal traits of the manufacturing firms’
business leaders, only the age at entry seems to influence the prob-
ability of survival, the negative sign of the coefficient indicating a non-
linear relation between both variables, just as we have observed for all
the firms. Likewise, the difference in survival between the median and
the maximum age at entry would be between 23 and 36 years in favor
of the former, as shown in Table 8.
The estimation results for the service firms only (Table 7) are quite
different −somehow complementary– from those for the manu-
facturing ones. Firstly, the SI taken in aggregated terms (specification
C1) appear to affect positively and significantly the probability of
business survival, the predicted longevity of a firm with two SI (median
value) compared with another without SI being between 15.1 and 16.6
years greater (Table 8). On the contrary, the overall patent applications
show no influence at all on the longevity of the service firms. That is,
although they have registered some patents during their lifetime (see
Table 2), this activity does not seem to have been relevant for their
survival. This could be explained by the fact that, as has been said,
patents are mostly oriented towards manufacturing.
When the SI are disaggregated by Schumpeterian forms (specifica-
tion C2),42 both new product and new process innovations appear to
significantly increase the probability of business survival.43 According
with our estimations, compared with a firm without any innovation, a
firm with one product innovation would survive 10.3 years more, and a
firm with one process innovation, 14.3 years more (Table 8). The spe-
cial relevance of these two types of innovation has been also high-
lighted by other survival studies (Cefis and Marsili, 2005, 2006, 2012;
Sharif and Huang, 2012; Børing, 2015). Marketing innovations also
show a significant effect on survival, but negative. This could be ex-
plained by the fact that marketing innovations are particularly focused
on the short term, but further research on the matter is needed. In fact,
this result seems to conflict with other studies which have found a
positive influence of marketing innovations on survival (Buddelmeyer
et al., 2010; Helmers and Rogers, 2010). Nevertheless, they use a dif-
ferent indicator for marketing innovations (trade mark applications), so
their results are not properly comparable with ours.
When we divide the SI by patented and non-patented (specification
C3) none of them are significant, although the non-patented ones are
close to being so.44 On the contrary, when the distinction is between
domestic and imported SI (C4), both kinds appear to influence survival
positively and significantly,45 the numerical effect of the imported ones
being greater. It is worth noting that the predicted longevity of a firm
with one imported SI would be some 39 years more than that of a firm
without any one (Table 8). This could be indicating that the adoption of
American innovations in retail and other activities by the British firms
since the beginning of the twentieth century was particularly relevant
for their performance.
Of the other five characteristics of the firm, four seem to influence
the survival probability in this case (Table 7). Like the manufacturing
companies, both firm size (specifications C2, C3 and C4) and family
business tradition (C1) seem to have a positive and significant effect on
business survival in services. The median company would survive be-
tween 25 and 35 years more than the smallest one, and between 12.7
and 14.7 years more than a firm without family business tradition
(Table 8). In addition, the two international dimensions appear to be
relevant in this sector, unlike in manufacturing. In particular, having
branches abroad (being a multinational) seems to greatly improve the
survival probability of the British service firms, this variable being
40 Some studies have found a positive effect of education on firm performance when
the founders’ studies are differentiated by types (e.g., Colombo and Grilli, 2005). Ex-
ploring this possibility with our sample would be an interesting line for further research.
41 When the censoring year is 1985, both new process SI and total patent applications
seem to affect significantly and positively the probability of survival, indicating that both
kinds of innovation are compatible. In fact, in the complete B2 specification (censored to
2013) both variables are also positive and significant (see Appendix B).
42 In the case of Model C2, the MLE estimation assuming the gamma distribution does
not converge.
43 When the censoring year is 1985, organizational innovations also appear to have a
positive effect.
44 In fact, when the censoring year is 1985, they show a highly significant and positive
effect on survival.
45 In this case, only according with the model based on the log-normal distribution.
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significant at 1% or 5% in the four specifications (from C1 to C4). The
longevity of a multinational would be between 25 and 48 years greater
than that of a firm not implanted abroad (Table 8). This result is in line
with the finding by Giovannetti et al. (2011) that FDI has a positive
effect on survival. Instead, the exporting activity shows a significant (at
the 5% or 10% level) but negative effect on business survival in three
specifications (C1, C2 and C3). This would indicate that providing
services abroad without a stable structure in the foreign country re-
duces the firm’s longevity. This result coincides with the findings by
Giovannetti et al. (2011), but conflicts with Esteve-Pérez et al. (2004,
2008), who each have found a positive effect of the exporting activity
on business survival. Finally, it is worth noting that having an out-
standing CSR, which was found important for survival in manu-
facturing, does not seem to have any influence in services. We are not
aware of other studies analyzing the effect of CSR on business survival
by industries, neither have we an explanation for this finding at this
moment, so it remains open to further evidence and discussion.
Among the personal traits of the business leaders of the service
companies, the age at founding/entry appears to be very influential on
the probability of survival in all the specifications (from C1 to C4), with
a non-linear effect, just as happens with all the companies (Table 5) and
the manufacturing ones (Table 6). In addition, in the case of the services
group, unlike in the other two, there are two more significant factors,
both of them positively affecting the probability of survival; namely,
the leader having worked in a similar previous sector (specifications C2
and C4) and having a high social background (C2–C4). Companies with
business leaders with any of these two characteristics would survive,
ceteris paribus, between about 22 and 54 years more than firms with
leaders lacking them (Table 8). Previous experience has also been
identified as important for business survival in services (Arribas and
Vila, 2007) as well as in manufacturing (Klepper, 2002; Thomson,
2005; Fontana and Nesta, 2009), while we are not aware of other
survival studies analyzing the social background of the entrepreneur.
Our results show that a high social position of the business leader seems
to be relevant for survival in services, but not in manufacturing. This
could be explained by the particular importance of social connections in
services such as banking or consultancy.
5.3. Robustness of the estimated models
It could be the case that the firms entering earlier had advantages in
adopting innovations compared to the firms entering later on, which
automatically would result in a positive relation between innovation
and survival. Although, as has been said in Section 4.1, this endogeneity
problem is not suggested by the descriptive statistics (see Tables 1 and
2), we have tested it by introducing the temporal factor in the analysis.
In order to do this, we have divided our data set between the firms
entering during the ‘golden age’ of the British economy (1816–1875)
and those entering from then on (1876–1957), and estimated the
models for each group separately (Models D and E).
From this exercise (Table 9),46 a problem of endogeneity cannot be
inferred as the survival probability of both the firms that entered up to
1875 and those that entered from then on is positively affected by in-
novation, the former not showing an advantage to innovate compared
to the latter. It is certain, though, that they differ in the type of in-
novation influencing survival, but this is reasonable and coherent with
our previous findings. In the case of the firms entering in the first period
(Model D), incremental innovations (total patent applications) are the
most influential on survival (specification D1), as happened with the
group of manufacturing firms (Table 6). This is not surprising given the
prominence of manufacturing before 1875. Although smaller, a positive
effect on survival of the significant innovations dealing with new
sources of supply is also observable for the firms entering before 1875
(specification D2), this being reasonable because of the higher chances
of finding new sources of supply in earlier times.
On the other hand, the probability of survival of the firms entering
after 1876 (specifications E1 and E2) is positively affected only by
significant innovations, as occurs with the overall set of firms (Table 5)
and the service group (Table 7). Precisely, the greater presence of ser-
vice firms among those entering after 1876 is a plausible explanation of
this. When the significant innovations are divided by Schumpeterian
types (specification E2), new processes and new products appear to
positively influence the survival probability of firms entering after
1875, as happens with the overall set and/or the group of service firms
(Tables 5 and 7). In addition, the development of new organizational
methods appear to positively affect the survival of that group of firms
(and not the other ones), this being reasonable given that organiza-
tional innovations increased their relevance since the last decades of the
nineteenth century.
In relation with the other firm’s characteristics, the main difference
between both groups is that the exporting activity seems to be negative
for the survival probability of the companies entering in 1816–75
(specifications D1 and D2) and indifferent for those entering later on
(E1 and E2). This is in line with the conflicting results on the effect of
the exporting activity on business survival obtained by previous re-
search (vid. supra), but seems to indicate quite clearly that exporting
was particularly negative for the survival of firms entering before 1875.
This could be explained by the high transport costs previous to the first
great globalization. On the contrary, having branches abroad and a
bigger size seem to be positive factors for survival in both groups, as
happens with the overall set of firms (Table 5). In relation with the
personal traits of the founder/business leader, the most striking result is
that none of them seem to have any influence on the survival prob-
ability of the firms entering in the first period (1816–1875). This could
be indicating, as seems reasonable, that the founder/business leader’s
influence decreases with the age of the company. In relation with the
firms entering after 1875, two features appear to significantly affect
business survival. The first one is the age at entry, which has a non-
linear effect as happens in all the previous estimated models (Tables
5–7). The second one is the business leader being an inventor, which
has a negative effect on survival. This could be explained by the in-
creasing relevance of managerial compared to technical conditions of
the business leader since the last decades of the nineteenth century
(Chandler, 1977), together with the fact that inventors are frequently
not the best entrepreneurs.
To sum up, the analysis of the firms by periods of entry (Table 9)
does not reflect an endogeneity problem between innovation and
longevity and confirms by and large −with some explainable differ-
ences– the results of our previous estimations (Tables 5–7) by identi-
fying innovation, firm size, multinational presence and the business
leader’s age at entry as the main factors influencing business survival.
Hence, it gives robustness to our analysis.
Another way to test whether our estimations are adequate is by
checking certain properties of the Cox-Snell residuals resultant from the
estimation of the log-normal models. This can be made graphically or
statistically. The former way implies the graphic representation of the
relation between the dependent variable (longevity) in logarithms and
the residuals resulting from the model, called Cox-Snell residuals, also
in logarithms. If the scatter graph is well adjusted to the 45° line from
the origin, then it can be said that the estimation is valid. According
with this, Fig. 2, which shows the Cox-Snell residuals of the first spe-
cification of all the (log-normal) estimated models, confirms their
adequacy.47
The statistical way to test the validity of the models is by checking
46 For reasons of space, only the results of specifications 1 and 2 have been included in
the Table. All the results are available upon demand.
47 This can be also said for Model C1, although in this case the residuals’ dispersion is
greater than in the rest of the models because of the fewer number of service companies.
J.M. Ortiz-Villajos, S. Sotoca Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
15
whether the Cox-Snell residuals follow a distribution of unitary extreme
value, that is, with mean and variance equal to one. As shown in
Table 10, this condition is fulfilled for the models we have estimated, so
their validity is statistically confirmed. For reasons of simplicity, we
have only displayed the information on the models relative to all the
firms (A1–A4), but similar results have been achieved for the rest of the
models. That is, the Cox-Snell residuals of all of them follow a dis-
tribution of unitary extreme value, hence they all are adequate.
6. Conclusions
Using a prosopographical approach, we have collected data on the
longevity −years from entry to end of the original entrepreneurial
project– and innovation activity −measured by significant innovations
(SI) and by total patent applications– of two hundred top British firms
active throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We have
tested the relation between innovation (and its types) and business
survival, controlling for five features of the companies and seven of
their business leaders. We have done this for the overall set of firms and
for the manufacturing and service ones separately to control for in-
dustry differences. In addition, for robustness check, we have developed
the same analysis dividing the sample by periods of entry. For the
econometric test, we have used a parametric duration model, which
implies the assumption of a specific density function for the dependent
variable. Among the possible options, we have found that the two most
Fig. 2. Relation between Cox-Snell residuals and longevity in specification 1 of all the log-normal estimated models.
Table 10
Mean, variance, and 95% confidence intervals of the Cox-Snell residuals of the
preferred models A1 to A4: All firms (from Table 5).
Preferred Model Mean (95% confidence
interval)
Variance (95% confidence
interval)
Model A1 1.221 (1.092; 1.351) 0.878 (0.800; 0.961)
Model A2 1.216 (1.089; 1.341) 0.857 (0.781; 0.939)
Model A3 1.226 (1.098; 1.354) 0.865 (0.788; 0.950)
Model A4 1.221 (1.092; 1.351) 0.876 (0.799; 0.960)
Note: If the Cox-Snell residuals follow a unitary extreme value distribution, both
their mean and variance must be statistically equal to 1.
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adequate −from the statistical point of view and the characteristics of
the endogenous variable– are the log-normal and the gamma distribu-
tions, both of them having provided very similar results.
Respecting the main focus of the study −the relation between in-
novation and business survival–, the conclusions can be summarized as
follows. When we look at the whole group of firms, the SI show a po-
sitive and significant influence on the probability of business survival,
while the overall number of patents does not seem to have any effect.
This would indicate that the longevity of the top British companies has
depended more on a few significant (radical) innovations than on many
incremental ones. But not all SI are the same: when they are dis-
aggregated by types, new process, non-patented and domestic innova-
tions emerge as the specific ones influencing survival. But when the set
of companies is divided by industries, the results are quite different. In
particular, the manufacturing firms’ survival is influenced positively
and significantly by their total patent applications and not by their SI,
except when the latter refer to new processes. Thus, incremental in-
novations seem to be more important than radical ones for the manu-
facturing firms’ longevity, although the positive effect of new processes
reinforces the relevance of this specific type of SI. On the contrary,
business survival in services is positively and significantly affected by SI
(new products and new processes), but not by total patents, which in
part can be explained by the fact that patents are mostly oriented to-
wards manufacturing. When the sample is divided by period of entry,
both the companies that entered before and after 1875 show a positive
relation between innovation and survival. This is a sign of robustness of
our estimations and suggests the unlikelihood of an endogeneity pro-
blem, namely, that the earlier firms had an advantage to innovate
compared to the most recent ones. Although the types of innovation
influencing survival differ between the firms entering during the
‘golden age’ of the British economy (1816–1875) and those entering
later on (1876–1957), this is reasonable and coherent with our previous
findings.
In relation with the five firm-level control variables included in the
analysis, the size achieved by the firm appears to be the most important
one, as it affects positively and significantly the probability of business
survival of the whole set of companies as well as of all the sub-groups
separately (manufacturing and service firms, and those entering before
and after 1875). Having branches abroad (being a multinational) in-
fluences positively and significantly the probability of survival of the
whole set of firms and of those entering in the first and the second
period, as well as of the services group, but not of the manufacturing
one. The same happens with the family business tradition, with the
exception of the firms entering in 1816–75, for which this factor is not
influential. Having an outstanding CSR seems to increase the survival
probability only of the manufacturing firms. The only factor reducing
the probability of survival is the exporting activity, but only for the
services group and the firms entering before 1875.
Lastly, among the seven business leader’s personal traits included as
control variables, the most influential is the age at founding (or entry)
as it is significant in all the estimations except for the group of firms
entering in 1816–75. The negative sign of the coefficient in all the cases
indicates a non-linear effect of age (taken in logarithms) on the firm’s
longevity. Two other traits −previous experience in the same sector
and being of a high social background– show a significant (and posi-
tive) effect on survival, but only for the service firms, thus indicating
that the personal influence of the business leader is particularly relevant
in services. Being an inventor seems to affect (negatively) the survival
probability only of the firms entering after 1876. The business leader
being the founder as well as his educational characteristics −having
college studies or an apprenticeship– do not show any influence on the
survival probability of the top British firms. A more detailed analysis of
these features, such as differentiating by types of higher education,
would maybe provide a more nuanced result, this being an interesting
field for further research.
The aforementioned results show the usefulness of the
prosopographical approach to provide new empirical evidence about
the complex nature and effects of innovation on business survival. They
apply to the business elite of a specific country. So an interesting task
for the future would be to construct similar databases for other coun-
tries in order to find out to what extent the patterns found here can
generalize. In terms of policy implications, the study suggests that de-
veloping significant innovations −particularly new processes– would
be the most effective way to increase the probability of business sur-
vival in general. But the innovation strategies should differ by sectors,
the promotion of continuous incremental innovations being more im-
portant in manufacturing, while service firms would rather opt for
fewer but more relevant innovations, both in products and processes.
Finally, educational programs to stimulate innovative startups among
young people would probably increase the number of long-lasting and
large employment providing companies.
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